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Introduction
Over the last twenty years, Turkey’s
defense industry has grown as a result of the
country’s strict adherence to a policy that favors
domestic defense procurement and seeks com-
plete self-sufficiency. However, in a global indus-
try marked by increasing cooperation, this
policy will soon become sub-optimal. This
article seeks to identify the changes Turkey
should make to its procurement policy in order
to best develop its defense industry — changes
which will benefit national and regional secu-
rity as well as increase the nation’s role as a
global defense manufacturer.
The state of the global defense industry
is especially important to Turkey because of the
country’s geography, the role and size of its
armed forces, and the country’s many security
threats. Turkey lies in the middle of three
regions of instability: the Caucasus, the Balkans,
and the Middle East. (Hickok, p. 1) Its loca-
tion, in combination with its status as a secu-
lar state surrounded by Islamic countries,
contributes to its need for a large army. The
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) make up the sec-
ond largest army in NATO and participate in
peacekeeping missions throughout the globe (in
2008, they were deployed to nine different coun-
tries). (“Turkey Defence . . . ,” p. 31) Addition-
ally, the TAF often intercede in political matters
and respond to internal security threats.
(Mardell, p. 2) For the past several years,
Turkey’s main security challenge has been the
Kurdish separatist group known as the PKK,
which is active mostly in mountainous South-
eastern Turkey. Moreover, while tensions with
Armenia and Greece have lessened, growing
hostility between Turkey and Israel may lead
to increased conflict in the area.
Turkey plays a role not only in interna-
tional defense, but is also a major player in
global arms procurement. Historically, a large
portion of Turkey’s national budget has been
spent on defense, making it one of the world’s
top three global defense importers for most of
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the past twenty years. (“Turkey Defence . . . ,”
p. 34) Furthermore, its growth in defense spend-
ing has been the highest amongWestern Allies.1
(Sandler and Hartley, p. 9) The global economic
landscape and Turkey’s position as a large
defense importer have allowed it to exercise
leverage on its suppliers through its procure-
ment policy, with the goal of expanding its
indigenous (domestic) defense industry by
requiring knowledge and license transfers and
offset agreements.
In the first section of this article, I describe
the global economic landscape of the defense
industry and how it affects Turkey’s outlook. I
next describe Turkey’s historical motivations,
framework, and policy strategies for promot-
ing its indigenous defense industry. With this
background I analyze the strengths and weak-
nesses of Turkey’s defense policy and propose
changes based on the experience of other
nations. Finally, I explore what effect the inter-
governmental defense efforts within the EU will
have on the European defense arena in order
to highlight actions Turkey might take to ensure
that its efforts bear fruit in the future.
Global Landscape
In an analysis of Turkey’s role in today’s
defense arena, it is important to identify the
dynamics that affect the global industry as a
whole. Although more than half of the world’s
military expenditures are still incurred by the
U.S. (The World Bank Group), the global land-
scape of defense industries has been shifting
since the end of the Cold War. Since then, a
global marketplace has been replacing the old
U.S.-and Soviet-dominated system. Dr. Jurgen
Brauer, professor of economics at Augusta State
University, refers to the nations that have
emerged to create this global marketplace as
“second-tier producers.” These nations not only
buy and sell weapons systems globally, but
they also develop and build systems coopera-
tively across borders. Second-tier producers are
nations that lack the capability to produce com-
plex weapon systems independently, and, unlike
first-tier producers, rely on cooperation, joint
ventures, and specialization. (Brauer, p. 106) In
this new world order, cooperation between the
defense industries and the procurement agen-
cies of allied nations is more important than
ever. (Brauer, p. 113)
The transition to this new world order is a
direct consequence of the decline in global mil-
itary expenditures in the 1990s. As a percentage
of GDP, global military expenditures dropped
from four percent to below two and one half per-
cent between 1989 and 1999 and have remained
there ever since. (The World Bank Group)
Defense budgets dropped worldwide due to
decreases in military tension with the collapse
of the Soviet Union. Because of this, armed
forces have downsized and are shifting from ter-
ritorial defense toward peacekeeping. The cur-
rent resurgence of security tensions with the
war against terror requires smaller but more
sophisticated defense mechanisms. It is only
natural that these changes on the demand
side of the defense arena have triggered trans-
formations in the industries that supply their
needs. These changes include industry consol-
idation and increased cooperation/technology
transfers between nations. Defense firms and
governmental agencies within Europe and in
the U.S. have reacted differently to this situa-
tion. I compare and contrast their reactions
below and discuss their effects on Turkey’s
situation.
According to a U.S. General Accounting
Office (GAO) report to Congress in 1998, U.S.
corporations underwent drastic reform in the
early 1990s through a series of mergers and
acquisitions. These resulted in a smaller num-
ber of larger firms that work as national “cham-
pions” with the country’s procurement agencies
to meet the needs of the armed forces. (GAO,
pp. 1–2) Given the post-Cold War decrease in
demand, the industry would have struggled with
profit margins without a significant reduction
in assets. (Deutch, p. 1) Furthermore, consoli-
dating its defense industry allowed the U.S. to
remain competitive by taking advantage of
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1Sandler and Hartley refer to the following countries
as Western Allies in their analysis of defense spending
trends: U.S., Germany, New Zealand, Belgium, Denmark,
Netherlands, UK, France, Japan, Canada, Spain, and Turkey.
2Rogerson argues that in order to profitably produce
a complicated weapons system, high fixed costs and
R&D spending must be spread out across many units in
what is referred to as batch production. A single coun-
try’s defense needs are no longer sufficient to warrant sev-
eral companies producing large batches of complicated
equipment.
economies of scale2 which play a large role in
the production of complex weapons systems.
(Rogerson, p. 71)
Private defense firms in the EU reacted
to the emergence of more efficient, consolidated
U.S. firms by embarking on a reform of their
own. Although the transition has been more
sluggish in the EU, Jocelyn Mawdsley cites the
consolidation of three defense giants — BAE
Systems, EADS, and Thales — as early signs
of a move toward efficiency. (Mawdsley, p. 327)
Unlike the U.S. mergers, however, some EU
mergers have involved firms from other EU
countries. Perhaps more importantly, the Euro-
pean governments have been more flexible in
allowing for technology transfers with allies.
This culture of openness becomes a competitive
advantage in the negotiation of international
deals with offset agreements. Countries gener-
ally seek to maintain their balance of trade
and protect their native defense industries by
requiring offsets on defense import deals, which
are contractual obligations often found in inter-
national defense and aerospace deals. For exam-
ple, in an offset agreement the supplier will
either produce some of the goods in the pur-
chaser’s country in conjunction with a domes-
tic firm, or it will procure a certain percent-
age of the value of the goods from the purchaser
in the future. Reduced restrictions on license
and technology transfers allow defense firms
to work together more efficiently and per-
suade protectionist governments to engage in
defense imports. By tapping into international
markets, firms can spread out the expense of
designing and manufacturing complicated
defense systems.
Although the U.S. used to be Turkey’s main
provider of defense equipment, recent Turkish
procurement deals have been dominated by
European firms, largely because Europe has less
stringent technology transfer policies. (Engin-
soy and Bekdil, p. 1) (Notable exceptions include
large, ongoing air force deals negotiated
through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
program.) (Enginsoy and Bekdil, p. 3) One
example of a recent European victory over a U.S.
firm was Turkey’s choice of AgustaWestland (a
British-Italian group) over Bell Helicopter (U.S.)
for the purchase of at least fifty military helicop-
ters.3 In a Defense News article, one unnamed
expert in the defense industry explains Turkey’s
preferences for European manufacturers as a
result of this competitive advantage in technol-
ogy transfer policies. As he states, “European
firms, especially Italians, are generally very gen-
erous in technology transfer as well as in mat-
ters like corporate strategic depth and possi-
ble cooperation in . . . [foreign] . . . countries.”
(Quoted in Enginsoy and Bekdil, p. 1)
The fact that Turkey has been leaning
toward Europe in its defense deals is one of
the effects of Turkey’s current procurement pol-
icy. Below, a closer look at the history of Turkey’s
defense procurement in the past three decades
reveals the motivations, framework, and pol-
icy strategies for the buttressing of Turkey’s
indigenous defense industry.
Strengthening the Indigenous
Defense Industry: Motivation,
Framework, and Strategies
The relevant history of Turkey’s defense
acquisitions began during the Cold War when
the Republic of Turkey obtained practically all
of its defense equipment through military aid
from the U.S. (“Turkey Buys . . . ,” p. 1)
Throughout this period of military tension,
Turkey played a key role as a buffer state
between the West and the U.S.S.R., policing
naval traffic through the Bosporus. The
Bosporus divides eastern and western Istan-
bul, Europe from Asia, and is the only waterway
connecting the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara
and thus to the Mediterranean. The surge of mil-
itary aid from the U.S. to Turkey during the Cold
War caused Turkey’s small but growing defense
industry, which had germinated during
Ataturk’s regime, to atrophy. (Karasapan, p. 27)
During this period, Turkish dependence on
the U.S. for military financing included funding
for its military equipment and most of its train-
ing. (“Turkey Buys . . . ,” p. 1)
This all changed in 1974 with the Turk-
ish invasion of Cyprus, which resulted in a West-
ern arms embargo of Turkey (Bekdil 2008,
p. 106). The embargo served as the motivation
for Turkey to take arms production into its own
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3Other recent European victories over U.S. firms in
Turkish defense tenders include a submarine deal with Ger-
man HWD, a deal for Turkey’s first military satellite with
Italian Telespazio, and another AgustaWestland helicopter
deal. (Enginsoy and Bekdil, p. 1)
hands. In 1985 the Turkish Parliament reacted
to the embargo by passing Law 3238, building
a framework that it hoped would one day lead
to a self-reliant, indigenous Turkish defense
industry. (Savunma, p. 1) Although the threat
of a Western embargo is no longer significant
and Turkey’s foreign procurement is now signif-
icantly more diversified, this framework persists
and its priorities remain unchanged.
Law No. 3238 created the three organi-
zations that continue to manage Turkish
defense procurement today. (Hickok, p. 4) The
first is the Undersecretariat for Defense Indus-
tries (SSM), which issues requests for proposals
(RFPs) for the TAF’s procurement tenders. It
collects and evaluates competing company bids
for these tenders and conducts project manage-
ment duties for ongoing programs. The sec-
ond organization, the Defense Industry Exec-
utive Committee, is a group appointed by the
Turkish Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense,
and the Chief of General Staff. This group
reviews the SSM’s evaluations of company
bids and selects the winners. The third organi-
zation is the Defense Industry Support Fund
(SSDF), a state-owned investment company that
provides extra-budgetary funding for procure-
ment activities. The funding for the equip-
ment itself comes mostly from the budget of the
Ministry of Defense (MOD). (Sünnetci, p. 93)
Additionally, Law 3238 describes the
agency’s two main goals as the “development of
the Turkish defense industry” and the “modern-
ization of the Turkish armed forces.” (Subasi,
p. 4) In other words, Turkey must structure
its procurement policy “to produce all of the
defense equipment needed by [the] TAF in
Turkey as far as this is technically possible and
economically viable.” (Sünnetci, p. 96) In order
to perform these functions, the SSM has con-
centrated on enforcing a priority-based procure-
ment policy and promoting industry consolida-
tion. Table 1 depicts the types of RFPs the
SSM will issue in order of preference. A cer-
tain type of RFP will not be considered for the
procurement of a system unless all the possibil-
ities with a higher preference (those that lie
above it on the table) are deemed impossible for
the system.
When the SSM judges that local produc-
tion is not feasible, it issues a co-production
RFP, which delineates strict bidding rules with
the aim of creating opportunities for the Turk-
ish indigenous industry. Among its top priori-
ties is production on Turkish soil and the trans-
fer not only of know-how, but also of licenses so
that Turkish firms may export the product in
the future. (Bekdil 2008, p. 106)
If foreign firms are unwilling to transfer
licenses for a system, the SSM will issue an RFP
whereby the SSM purchases the system from
a foreign firm but the equipment itself is pro-
duced in Turkey by a Turkish firm. In this
case, although the license itself is not trans-
ferred, the know-how is. This encourages the
growth of the Turkish defense industry and
increases the number of Turkish jobs.
Finally, when all else fails, the SSM pur-
chases equipment off-the-shelf from foreign
companies, but makes sure that deals include
a large offset agreement. (Bekdil 2008, p. 106)
Offsets have become a major source of business
for Turkish defense firms. In fact, approximately
70 percent of the export revenues for Turkish
defense companies are from offsets. (Sünnetci,
p. 105) Offset agreements become an espe-
cially high priority for the SSM in off-the-
shelf purchases.
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Table 1
Turkey’s Priority-based Procurement Policy
Type Stipulations
Indigenous Development A Turkish firm will be paid for both design and production.
Co-Production Turkish and foreign firm share licensing rights and most
of the production occurs in Turkey.
Production under License System is designed abroad and foreign firm maintains rights to
the system, but it is manufactured in Turkey.
Off-the-shelf System is purchased from foreign firm with a
large offset agreement.
Source: Bekdil 2008.
The other strategy used by the SSM to pro-
mote the growth of its indigenous defense
industry falls outside of the realm of defense
procurement. Like the U.S. and Europe, Turkey
is aiming toward industry consolidation; but
in the Turkish case this effort is driven by the
state not the private sector. In April 2006 Turk-
ish Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan ratified
a plan to create a holding company owned by
the Foundation to Strengthen Turkish Armed
Forces (TSKGV), a foundation that operates
under military control. The process has stalled
due to political reasons, and there has been no
merger. (Bekdil 2008, p. 106) However, if the
merger were to happen, this holding company
would act as an umbrella firm for fourteen of
the largest Turkish defense firms. The aim of the
holding company would be to prevent duplica-
tion of efforts and make the industry more com-
petitive globally. (“Turkey Defence and Security
. . . ,” p. 37)
The Turkish Defense Industry:
Revenues and Industrial Production
The SSM has been consistent in applying
its preferential procurement policy to its pro-
curement process as described in the last sec-
tion. In this section I describe the growth of the
industry in the past decade according to pub-
lically available data. Indirect evidence of growth
can be seen in the increasing number of Turk-
ish companies that appear in the Turkish
Defense Industry Product Catalog — 160 in
1995 and 245 in 2007. (Sünnetci, p. 97) The
industry as a whole has experienced an increase
in sales revenue of 70 percent and an almost
three-fold increase in exports between 2004 and
2008. (Defence Industry . . . , p. 4) The num-
ber of defense products manufactured by Turk-
ish firms has also increased. Some of the prod-
ucts that are currently in either indigenous
development and production contracts or co-
production contracts are very sophisticated. For
example, Turkey will soon have production capa-
bilities and licenses to export its own trainer
plane, attack helicopter, and main battle tank
platforms into the world markets.
The Defense Industry Manufacturers Asso-
ciation (SASAD) is an organization that provides
information about the Turkish defense industry
to and from the military and the public. Its data
show an average annual growth in domestic rev-
enues of eight percent in the period between
1997 and 2008, which is three percent above
Turkey’s average annual GDP growth rate for the
same period. Figure 1 shows the difference
between the industry’s sales growth and GDP
growth for each year; in eight of eleven years the
industry grew more quickly than the Turkish
economy as a whole.
The Turkish Statistical Institute calculates
the Monthly Industrial Production Index as a
metric for short term economic decisions
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Figure 1
Domestic Sales Growth (%) less GDP Growth
Source: Defence Industry Manufacturers Association and World Bank Group.
regarding Turkish production. (Turkish Statis-
tical Institute) Although the Turkish Statisti-
cal Institute does not publish data for the entire
defense industry, it does publish the production
index for manufacturers involved in weapons
and ammunitions. For the periods between
2005 and 2009 the average monthly increase
in this index was 12 percent compared to 0.85
percent for production by manufacturers in
general.
Figure 2 depicts the yearly average growth
rates in the production index of weapons and
ammunition and for manufacturers in gen-
eral. The peak in 2006 can be traced to an
increase of 262 percent between the months
of February and March. Even after removing
this outlier, the average monthly growth for
weapons and ammunition remains at almost 8
percent. Granted, weapons and ammunition
do not encompass the entire Turkish defense
industry, but this portion of the defense indus-
try is growing more quickly than the rest of
Turkish manufacturing.
Both revenue and industrial production
figures show that the growth of the defense
industry in Turkey has outpaced that of other
Turkish industries in the past decade. How-
ever, this growth has come at a high cost for sev-
eral defense stakeholders in Turkey. The restric-
tive nature of Turkish procurement policy leads
to higher costs for the Turkish taxpayer. By lim-
iting the market to those willing to accept
licensing and knowledge transfers, Turkey’s
restrictive policy leads to higher prices due to
decreased competition. Furthermore, Turkish
indigenous production and co-production —
both favored by the SSM — are often haunted
by delays (especially for more complicated sys-
tems). Delays translate into higher costs for the
Turkish taxpayers, operational difficulties for the
TAF, and the need for interim purchases to com-
pensate for such delays.
Turkey’s major indigenous defense pro-
curement programs, its first trainer aircraft
(HURKUS), its attack helicopters (ATAK), and
its main battle tank (ATLAY), have all faced
major delays that have led to interim purchases.
In the case of HURKUS, the SSM had to enter
into a concurrent deal with Korea Aerospace
Industries (KAI) for 57 basic trainers in order to
fill the air force’s need for trainer aircraft. Due
to more than ten years of delays (Bekdil 2007,
pp. 1–2), the SSM signed a contract to pro-
cure Cobra Whiskey helicopters from Italian
manufacturer Italeri. (Bayar, p. 1) Delays on the
ATLAY main battle tank project, which can be
traced back to 1996 (“Turkey’s Potential . . . ,”
p. 1), prompted two interim battle tank modern-
ization programs (M-60 and Leopard 1). A Leop-
ard 2 modernization program may also be
required to compensate for ATLAY’s delays.
(Bayar, p. 2) Each of these delays and interim
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Figure 2
Average Growth of Industrial Production Index Disaggregated
Source: Turkish Technical Institute.
purchases has led to costs that were not initially
budgeted for and have created inefficiencies in
the system.
There are experts in the field who believe
Turkey is embarking on unrealistic defense pro-
curement projects. They argue that by reaching
too far beyond its capabilities, the SSM is caus-
ing the aforementioned delays. Turkish defense
journalist Burak Bekdil has published articles
in which he criticizes the SSM for being too
optimistic when it comes to indigenous produc-
tion programs and accuses it of incurring
unnecessary costs. We need not read past the
titles — “Why Turkish Efforts for ‘Indigenous
Development’ Are Too Ambitious” and “How Not
to Buy Weapons Systems” — to note how far-
fetched he believes the Turkish procurement
policies are.
Jurgen Brauer warns that a nation on
the path to becoming a tier-two producer may
be “overreaching” by trying to tackle an array of
projects that are too wide or too sophisticated.
This exposes the procurement process to higher
risks and the possibility of failure. (Brauer,
pp. 105, 108) He points out that to gain eco-
nomic advantage from import substitution,
countries must focus on products related to
their existing infrastructure. (Brauer, p. 108) In
other words, he suggests that countries should
reach for the lowest hanging fruit, which is
determined by the industries that already thrive
in the region. Turkey has a thriving automobile
industry4 and produces an indigenous amphibi-
ous vehicle platform, Otokar’s Cobra 4X4, which
is exported to a few countries around the globe.
(Sünnetci, p. 104) This may be an area in which
Turkey possesses a competitive advantage that
will allow it to reap economic benefits through
import substitution and exports.
The French Experience: Lessons to
be Learned
Turkey is not alone in facing delays and
cost overruns in the defense acquisition arena.
In fact, cost overruns and delays occur world-
wide and have been worsened by budget
decreases. However, as evidenced by France’s
procurement reform in the early 1990s, meth-
ods to prevent them do exist. (Kapstein and
Oudot, p. 1) Below I describe how the shortcom-
ings of the Turkish procurement policy and
defense industry might be remedied by adopt-
ing the French experience.
Today France’s average defense procure-
ment cost overrun is in the five to ten percent
range whereas the U.S. averages 26 percent.
(Kapstein and Oudot, p. 2) Explaining how
France has managed to obtain better outcomes,
Kapstein and Oudot cite France’s use of hard
budget constraints on defense purchases, the
country’s use of a “responsibility principle” in
its contracts, and the technical capabilities of its
procurement agency. (Kapstein and Oudot,
pp. 1, 13) Hard budget constraints entail cut-
ting projects that go over budget. It shatters the
notion that if a project goes under budget, its
surplus can be used to cover a project that
goes over budget. (Kapstein and Oudot, p. 9)
Contracts can be renegotiated if unexpected
costs arise, but hard budget constraints give
project managers the incentive to be tougher
with their counterparts in the industry.
The “responsibility principle” addresses
the need to provide the right incentives for both
the procurement agents and the defense firms
they work with in order to maximize the ben-
efit obtained from procurements while con-
strained to a country’s limited resources. Gar-
dener and Moffat point out this incentive
problem in their description of what they refer
to as the “conspiracy of optimism.” (Gardener
and Moffat, p. 225) According to their theory,
decision makers in defense acquisition have
incentives to overestimate benefits from large
projects and underestimate their costs in the
early stages of the development of a weapon sys-
tem, leading unavoidably to cost overruns.
Using quantitative game theory analysis, they
have identified uncertainty regarding project
outcomes as a major determinant of these
estimation errors. (Gardener and Moffat,
pp. 229–30) Both the acquisition agency and the
industry perceive a benefit from being unreal-
istically optimistic in projects with high uncer-
tainty due to lack of accountability. They attrib-
ute many of the cost overruns and delays that
plague defense procurement to these systemic
incentives. The French, however, have managed
to minimize the effects of this problem using
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4For more information on Turkey’s automobile indus-
try see “Turkey’s Automotive Industry: Driven to Grow”
by CJ Berzin in this issue.
the “responsibility principle.” As described by
Kapstein and Oudot, the responsibility princi-
ple refers to the restructuring of incentives
through the use of contractual design. Well-
designed contracts establish accountability for
delays and cost overruns. (Kapstein and Oudot,
p. 13) A country can establish accountability
by designing and strictly enforcing contracts
with two important features: more accurate esti-
mates of the project’s costs and outcomes, and
consequences for delays and poor performance.
These changes should be particularly effective
for uncertain projects. An example could be
Turkey’s first main battle tank project (ATLAY)
because it is the country’s first attempt at build-
ing that particular system.
However, a country will not be able to
establish appropriate hard budget constraints
or create and enforce strict contracts if it lacks
human capital and technical capabilities within
its acquisitions agency. With over 200 ongo-
ing projects and the number increasing every
year, Mr. Necati Subasi, defense expert at the
SSM, foresees that the procurement agency will
have to grow in the near future. (Subasi, p. 17)
If the SSM begins to hire aggressively, it has the
opportunity to focus on the type of talent that
has allowed France to minimize overruns in
its defense procurement over the past two
decades.
Kapstein and Oudot maintain that one of
the main catalysts for French success in this
area is the “cozy but correct” relationship
between the French procurement agency (DGA)
and its industry counterparts. (Kapstein and
Oudot, p. 11) They claim that the relationship
exists because many defense procurement offi-
cials have worked “on the floor” for defense
manufacturers before being hired by the state;
they have long-standing relationships with the
firms they work with and understand their
processes. Because Turkey conducts procure-
ment programs with many companies across
the globe and focuses on cooperation and
knowledge transfers, the qualities of its employ-
ees should be focused around skills and knowl-
edge that would facilitate these activities.
A second strength of French procurement
employees is their high level of technical pro-
ficiency which is achieved in two ways. First, the
French procurement agency has historically not
only managed procurement, but has also
directly conducted research and development
(R&D). Second, the DGA, considered to be a very
prestigious agency by French engineers, is capa-
ble of attracting people from the best French
universities or “grandes ecoles.” (Kapstein and
Oudot, p. 10) With the right talent, a procure-
ment agency can understand the technical intri-
cacies needed to develop each specific weapons
system, resulting in better contract design
and more effective project management and
contract enforcement.
Defense Trends in the European
Union: Looking toward the Future
Changes in the defense industry in Europe
are being shaped by the response of the increas-
ingly bureaucratic intergovernmental agen-
cies that affect the policies of the countries in
the EU. These changes will have a direct impact
on the economic environment the SSM oper-
ates under and should play a role on the evo-
lution of its policy. It is imperative for the
continued growth of the Turkish defense indus-
try that the SSM not only adapt to these changes
when they happen, but proactively anticipate
them, placing Turkey in a position that facili-
tates growth.
Today, the intergovernmental agencies
that are leading efforts in European defense pol-
icy are the European Defense Agency and the
European Commission. Although it is not
clear which of the two agencies will decide
future European policies, Dr. Jocelyn Mawdsley,
professor at Newcastle University and expert
in European and defense policy, argues that
increased intergovernmental defense procure-
ment regulation in the EU will lead to decreased
manufacturing of weapons systems within
smaller European states. Foreseeable changes
include lower domestic protectionism, increased
competition within the industry, firm consoli-
dation and interdependence, and industry devel-
opment around so-called European “centers of
excellence.” (Mawdsley, pp. 378, 381)
Jocelyn Mawdsley predicts that decision
making in the defense arena will be influenced
by commercial factors as opposed to political
factors, and that the production of the most
complex weapons systems will occur on a
cooperative, transnational basis. (Mawdsley,
pp. 381–82) If these predictions hold, even
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Jurgen Brauer’s current first-tier producers will
become second-tier producers. Evidence that
this is beginning to happen in the aerospace
arena can be seen in the Lockheed-Martin-led
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) being developed and
produced by several Western allies including
Turkey, which is in charge of approximately
three percent of production. (Subasi, p. 26)
Such cooperation allows countries not only to
share resources by manufacturing these systems
modularly, but also increases their ability to sell
the systems in foreign markets to alleviate the
problem of lower domestic demand. The EU is
leading a similar project, the joint production
of the A400M transport aircraft (Mawdsley
p. 373), in which Turkey also has a role. (Sub-
asi, p. 28)
When weapons systems become so complex
and expensive to manufacture that nations must
team up to distribute the workload and the
cost, only industries with the greatest competi-
tive advantages and the highest technical infra-
structure will be capable of adding value to the
manufacturing process. Smaller European
defense manufacturers that have survived until
now on offsets and domestic protection policies
will cease to exist due to anti-protectionist Euro-
pean intergovernmental efforts. Turkey’s rela-
tively large demand for foreign weapons will con-
tinue to attract the attention of global defense
manufacturers even though it is not part of the
EU. Turkey should be able to play a large role
in manufacturing large European weapon sys-
tems if the SSM focuses on the domestic indus-
try’s core competencies and infrastructure. Find-
ing its place in this new supply chain may not
only provide the Turkish defense industry with
large contracts but will ensure that the TAF are
equipped with the best equipment in the world
for their delicate missions.
Conclusion
After the Western arms embargoes of the
1970s, Turkey embarked on the goal of achiev-
ing complete independence in the defense
procurement arena. For decades it consis-
tently applied the strategies of preferential treat-
ment of domestic firms, staunch demands for
knowledge transfers, and offset agreements,
all of which have led to high growth in the
defense arena. Yet recent trends in the world’s
political and commercial environment, specif-
ically within the defense arena, make the goal
of complete independence inappropriate and
impractical.
The threat of another Western arms
embargo against Turkey, even in high stress sit-
uations like those unfolding with Israel, is
highly unlikely. Furthermore, even Jurgen
Brauer’s first-tier producers are beginning to act
like second-tier producers due to the com-
mercialization and depolitization of defense pro-
curement decisions. Turkey does not need to,
nor will it be able to, become completely inde-
pendent as a defense manufacturer. It must find
its place in the new European defense supply
chain and maximize its role within it.
Turkey’s defense procurement agency
needs a modified overarching goal that pro-
motes the growth of the country’s defense
industry without sacrificing the TAF with delays
and Turkish taxpayers with higher costs. This
new goal should be pursued using a new set of
priorities in the SSM’s procurement policy,
inspired by the French experience but tailored
to the situation in Turkey. Primarily, the SSM
must focus on hiring experts with experience in
both transnational defense manufacturing and
technical expertise to handle its growing num-
ber of projects. It should design hard budget
contracts that maximize commercial value
and accountability to control costs and delays.
Finally, it should encourage international com-
petition and transnational collaboration in its
defense bids to focus the Turkish industry into
areas where it can truly excel. These priorities
will not only insure that Turkey’s defense indus-
try continues to grow at a rapid pace, but also
that it grows in the areas in which Turkey has
a competitive advantage, preparing it for a more
competitive, global future.
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